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THE REJECTION OF AN OFFER.
MUST THE REJECTION OF AN OFFER BE COM-
MUNICATED TO THE OFFEROR?
The term communication is here used in its exact sense, that is
to say, information brought home to the intelligence of the party
for whom it is intended.
In examining the various requirements for the formation of a
contract we find that there is a necessity for communication between
the parties as to some steps which must be taken. It goes without
saying that an offer must be brought to the knowledge of the
offeree because by the term offer we mean a communication to the
offeree.
It is also, now, recognized by the best authorities that the
revocation of an offer must be communicated to'the offeree, and
that without such notification there is no revocation.'
Acceptance, on the other hand, need not be brought to the knowl-
edge of the offeror, whether such acceptance be given in a bilateral
or unilateral contract.
2
There remains, however, a mooted question as to whether there
can be a rejection of an offer without communication to the offeror.
In the development of our law it has become established that an
offeree can cause an offer to terminate by his own act. That .is to
say he can reject the offer. This he may do in one of three ways.
He may either make a new offer on his part or he may make what
purports to be an acceptance but is not effective as such because
there is a variation of a material term of the offer, or he may dis-
tinctly express himself in terms of rejection. By one of these
methods he can terminate an offer, although the offeror may have
designated a time during which the offer shall remain open, and
such time has not expired. At first sight this power on the part
of the offeree to terminate and extinguish the offer in spite of the
offeror, seems strange, but a moment's reflection shows us that
Brauer vs. Shaw, 163 Mass. 198.
2 See 2 Columbia Law Review i for an expression of the present writer's
views on this point.
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these well settled principles of our law are based upon reason, and
are sound. The object in making the offer in the first instance is
that the offeree may know the wish and intent of the offeror, while
the object in leaving the offer open is that the offeree may have ar
opportunity to reach a conclusion, and when he has done so the
reason for continuing the offer ceases, because it has performed it,
function.
But has it accomplished this object until the offeror knows ot
the offeree's disagreement, knows the offeree's state of mind?
Why is it that the authorities have agreed that revocation must be
communicated to the offeree? An examination of the reasons fc,
this conclusion may throw light upon the question as to why th
same requirement should exist as to a rejection. In explaining thi
necessity an able modern writer says:' "One to whom an off(
is made has a right to assume that it remains open according to i"
terms until he has actual notice to the contrary. The effect of tl.
communication must be destroyed by a counter communication."
But this argument applies precisely as well to the situation r
an offeror. He has indicated to the offefee his intent and desi"
that his offer should remain open and is entitled to assume that
does thus remain open unless he is informed to the contrary. Thei
appears to be just as cogent reasons for requiring communication i
the case of rejection as in that of revocation, and the term rejectic
seems to mean informing the offeror that his offer is not accepted.
WNhere the rejection is brought about by a new offer such ne
offer must, of course, be communicated, and we cannot say th;
while it is not as yet operative as a new offer, it is nevertheless
valid rejection, because it has the effect of a rejection only on tl
ground that making a new offer necessarily shows the offeror th-
the offeree has different ideas. Thus Lord Langdale says in Hyd
v. Wrench:' " . . . instead of that the plaintiff made a
offer of his own . . . and he thereby rejected the offer prey,
ously made by the defendant." That is, he rejected defendant
offer by an offer of his own. But there was no offer of his ow
until it was communicated to the defendant.
When the rejection is brought about in direct terms, it woul
also seem necessarily to indicate that communication must be mad,
When the offeree says, "I reject your offer," the reason why th.
offer ceases is that it has performed its function, in that the offere,
I Holmes Common Law, p. 3o6.
2 3 Beav. 334.
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has told the offeror that no agreement can be made on that basis.
The term rejection, then, means informing the offeror that his offer
is not accepted.
If the question were purely academic, it might not be of much
consequence, which conclusion is reached. In its application, how-
ever, vexing questions may arise, and such problems should be
solved upon principle. The chances of hardship or inconvenience
are as great upon one theory as upon the other.
It seems axiomatic to remark that a contract arises at some one
given point, or it does not arise at all. When the parties have
gone through certain formal steps the law will annex the obligation
of contract or will refuse so to do, and at that final point the wish
of one or both of the parties is entirely irrelevant. There is no
such thing as waiving any requirement in the formation of contract,
and if a bilateral contract is contemplated, both parties must be
bound at the point when the contract is to arise or neither can be.
One party cannot at his option waive any requirement or change
the fixed result. We cannot say a contract will arise at such a fixed
period at the option of one of the parties.
Resuming, then, the question as to rejection, the following case
may be supposed.
A man in New Haven receives by mail an offer for the delivery
of certain articles at his warehouse on July Ist. He replies, "I
accept your offer, delivery here on June Ist." The change of date
of delivery was made inadvertantly. Upon this reply being received,
it constitutes a rejection, and this is so even though the original
offeror had no objection to the change. No contract can arise,
unless the original offeror, now offeree, accepts this new offer.
Suppose, however, that the original offeror knows the law, under-
stands this to be a rejection, and acts upon this knowledge assuming
there is no contract. In the meantime, however, the original offeree
has discovered his mistake within an hour, has rewritten a proper
acceptance. and mailed the same at once, such mailing preceding
the receipt of the first letter. Then suppose the second letter is never
received. There is a contract in such a case, because the rejection
will not take effect until communicated, and hence the offer is still
in force, and while it thus remains in force an acceptance is properly
mailed causing the contract to arise co instante, which thus prevents
the first letter from having any effect whatever. Change the facts
slightly and suppose that the New Haven man says in his first
letter. "I reject your offer." Before this is received he mails an
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acceptance which is lost on the way. In each case the offeror i.;
misled by the first letter, and relying thereon changes his position.
Does this prevent a contract from arising? It certainly does not
unless we can stretch the much abused principle of estoppel in pais
to cover the case. It is true that the offeree has made a statement
to the offeror which the latter has reasonably acted upon to his loss.
Shall we then conclude that the courts will not allow the offeree
to say that he has accepted the offer? The difficulty is that we
are dealing with the preliminary requirements of contract, and must
therefore look beyond the acts of the parties to see whether the
situation is such that the courts will annex the obligation. It is
this element which causes the difficulty. That this is a real trouble
will appear by considering another question.
In Ricketts' v. Scothorn, the court, speaking tlrough Sullivan
uses this language: "Under the circumstances of this case is
there an equitable estoppel which ought to preclude the defendant
from alleging that the note in controversy is lacking in one of the
essential elements of a valid contract? We think there is.
Having intentionally influenced the plaintiff to alter her position for
the worse on the faith of the note being paid when due, it would be
grossly inequitable to permit the maker, or his executor, to resist
payment on the ground that the promise was given without con-
sideration."
It is true that the court here is treating the case of a promissory
note and at first sight, one might suppose that this fact had an
unconscious influence upon the result reached. It is evident, how-
ever, the court believes that such a note requires a common law
consideration. The case stands squarely for the view that one
may be estopped from showing there is no consideration to support
a promise. This same view is often suggested in cases which may
be illustrated as follows: A makes an offer requesting an act as
consideration for his proposed promise. This being an offer merely
can be withdrawn, of course, until it becomes a promise and it does
not become a promise until the consideration is furnished, that is,
until the act is completed. Suppose that the offeree has performed
nine-tenths of the requested act, and that the offeror then revokes
his offer. Clearly no promise arises in such a case, and the offeree
is without contract remedy for his loss occasioned by his part per-
formance. Very true, it is suggested, no contract arises in reality,
but the offeror is estopped from denying it. Certainly the case of
1 57 Neb. 5I.
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Ricketts v. Scothorn' is an authority for this view. Is it not
evident that such a doctrine practically wipes out the requirement of
consideration and thus eliminates one of the rules of law supposed
to be most firmly and clearly established?
If, then, one believes that our law does not recognize a promise
unless there is a consideration to support it, the conclusion must
be reached that the above case is erroneous and that one cannot be
estopped from denying a consideration. But does it necessarily
follow that the same argument applies to all the elements of a
contract? It is well settled that the courts take a position which
amounts to enforcing an estoppel in the case of a supposed offer
or acceptance. A man may not intend to make an offer, but if
his language is such as to reasonably indicate that he is making an
offer to another and that other accepts, there is a contract, and the
apparent offeror will, of course, not be allowed to say that he made
no offer. The courts say that we cannot read his secret thoughts,
and must judge his intent from the outward manifestation. Upon
whatever ground we place it, here is a situation in which there is
no real agreement between the parties, but one of them is not allowed
to show this, and hence he is bound precisely a though he had
assented. This is not open to doubt.
It is clear, then. that in some cases a contract may be found
although in reality the ordinary elements are lacking.
Where shall we draw the line? When the substantive law of
contract will be changed by invoking the principle of estoppel in pais
it would seem that the courts should refuse to apply this doctrine.
Thus to follow the case of Ricketts v. Scothorn 2 would, in most cases,
abrogate the doctrine of consideration, in that it is almost always pos-
sible for the one claiming a contract to show that he relied upon the
words of the other to his detriment. But it has been supposed that no
rule is better settled in our law than the one which requires a consid-
eration for a promise. Ricketts v. Scothorn would, therefore, seem to
be a piece of judicial legislation abrogating the doctrine of considera-
tion as to a large class of promises. Then again, in such a case, it
would be left to the option of the supposed promisee to say whether
a contract arises or not, whereas it is for the law to annex the
consequence of contract, not the parties. From every point of view
it seems indefensible to apply the doctrine of estoppel in such a
way as to sustain a promise without a common law consideration.
But this is not the situation as regards either an offer or rejection.
'Supra.2 Supra.
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The law requires so called "mutual assent," but that has never
necessarily been actual agreement and to hold a party as offeror
in accordance with his apparent, although not in truth his real,
intention does not introduce any new element into contract or take
away any essential requirement. And further it does not leave one
of the parties free to decide for himself whether the action taken
shall amount to a contract or not. If the supposed offeree accepts
he is as much bound as the other. So also in the case of a mailed
rejection followed by acceptance given above, if we say that the
rejection actually communicated has binding effect upon the parties,
in spite of the subsequently mailed acceptance, there is no change
in the requisite elements of contract, nor is it left to either party
to choose whether he shall hold that a contract did or did not arise.
The offeror receives the rejection and acts upon it to his loss. That
prevents the second letter, which otherwise would, cause the con-
tract to arise on mailing, from having any effect. There is one
difficulty, however, in this argument which is that at the moment
the second letter of acceptance is mailed, it should be certain that
a contract has or has not arisen, but the above suggestion would
leave the question in abeyance until determined by some subsequent
event. The first letter of rejection does not cause an estoppel
unless received and acted upon so as to cause an injury to the offeior
if withdrawn. That is to say, if the letter of rejection results in an
estoppel then no contract has arisen, but if not, then the contract
will be found as of the time when the second letter was mailed.
This is a serious difficulty in the argument, because certainly we
ought to be able to say absolutely that the contract either does or
does not arise at the time of mailing the second letter, and this
question should not be held in abeyance, nor subject to the will of
the offeror.
If this suggestion is fatal to the theory of estoppel in the case
supposed, then the necessary result seems to be that as a rejection
must be communicated, it has no effect in the above illustration,
because before it is communicated a proper acceptance has been
mailed, the contract has arisen, and when the proposed rejection is
communicated there is no offer left to reject. On the whole this seems
to be the sounder view.
In the formation of contract, then, communication between the
parties would seem to be requisite in the case of offer, revocation and
rejection of offer. Clarence D. Ashley.
New York University.
